CONTRIBUTIONS: CHOOSE HERE Carl-Göran Hedén;TIMEFRAMES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT John Hart: Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and related Considerations

 

.

Strengthening the

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and

related considerations

by John Hart

SIPRI*

Presented at:

Biosafety and Biosecurity Workshop for the Central Asian and Caucasus Regions,

20-21 September 2004

Almaty, Kazakhstan

* The views expressed are the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of SIPRI.

 

I. Introduction

The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC) is the principal international instrument against the use of biological weapons. The convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975.1 As of July 2004, 151 states have ratified or acceded to the treaty, while 16 states have signed but not acceded to the convention.2 As of the same date, there were 27 non-signatories to the BTWC.3

Major concerns affecting BTWC implementation have included suspected violations and the need to ensure that the treaty remains relevant in view of continuing technological and scientific developments. There is also an increased emphasis in the current international security environment on identifying and effectively meeting perceived threats posed by non-state actors (e.g., terrorists) that may wish to use biological weapons. Much of the effort to better meet this perceived threat is of a law enforcement or intelligence nature and is carried out on an ad hoc basis where like-minded countries cooperate on specific areas of concern.

The three main examples of ad hoc groupings in the field of biological weapons are the Australia Group (AG), the Group of Eight (G8) [industrialized countries] Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (established in 2002) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (established in 2003). The AG is an informal export control arrangement established in 1985 to prevent the misuse of technology, equipment and materials for chemical and biological weapon purposes.4 The G8 Global Partnership programme calls for the expenditure of $20 billion over 10 years to prevent states and non-state actors acquiring or developing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. It is, to a great extent, modeled on the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction(CTR) programme in that it funds inter alia the destruction of weapons, and the implementation of material control and accountability measures (e.g.,physical protection). The PSI was established by a group of like-minded states that have agreed a set of "interdiction principles" with the objective of preventing the shipment of "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD), their delivery systems and related materials.

On 28 April 2004 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1540 to protect against the threats of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery, including threats posed by non-state actors.

The resolution defines, for the purpose of the resolution only, a "non-state actor" as an individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities that come within the scope of this resolution.5 The resolution established a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the council, to evaluate and periodically report to the UN Security Council the status of implementation of the resolutions measures. The committee, which will be disbanded within two years, is tasked to periodically issue reports on steps it has taken or intends to take to implement the resolution. The resolution also states that none of its obligations "shall be interpreted so as to conflict or alter the rights and obligations" of parties to the BTWC, 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and 1970 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).6 As NBC weapons were judged to pose a grave threat to international peace and security, the resolutions decisions were taken under chapter VII of the UN Charter under which military force can be invoked in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.7

There are differing views on whether and how to apply these various measures to meet current and future perceived biological weapon threats. Some view multilateral arms control and disarmament regimes with suspicion and prefer to focus on measures involving the use of export controls, and the application of law enforcement, intelligence and military action. There is also great variation in the capabilities and level of interest among states to evaluate actual or potential biological weapon threats. Some states have a heightened threat perception, while other states do not feel directly threatened by biological weapons. Such differences partly reflect broader political and security considerations, as well as more philosophical differences on how states can or should interact in order to ensure that the international prohibition against biological warfare is effectively maintained.

II.
BTWC compliance and verification mechanisms

There are at least four multilateral mechanisms for investigating compliance concerns in relation to biological weapon development or use.8 In 1980 the UN Secretary-General was given the mandate to investigate allegations of use of chemical weapons by UN General Assembly resolution 35/144C without the prior approval of the UN Security Council. In 1982 his mandate was expanded to include possible violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, thereby including allegations of use of biological weapons.9 This authority, which was restricted in 1982 to allow for investigations of allegations raised by UN member states only, was exercised in the 1980s to early 1990s to investigate allegations of chemical and biological weapon use in Azerbaijan,10 Iran, Iraq and south east Asia.11 The authority has not been revoked. However, the international legal responsibility for investigating allegations of the use of chemical weapons and, perhaps, toxins currently rests with the OPCW, the body that implements the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC). Legal responsibilities in this area are based on the CWC, a relationship agreement between the UN and OPCW specifying the rights and obligations of both organisations, and other relevant legal instruments.12

BTWC parties may invoke a process to clarify compliance concerns regarding another party under the provisions of Article V.13 Specific procedures for the process were elaborated by the Third Review Conference. BTWC parties that wish to have a compliance concern addressed under this article submit a request to at least one of the treaty's three depositaries (the United Kingdom, United States and Russia) who, in turn, must immediately inform all BTWC parties of the request. The depositaries are then to convene an informal meeting of interested parties to discuss the arrangements for the formal consultative meeting. The formal meeting must be held within 60 days of the receipt of the request. It may be preceded by bilateral and other consultations among Those States involved in the problems that have arisen.14 This option has been exercised once. On 30 June 1997, Cuba submitted such a request to Russia alleging that a US aircraft, used for anti-drug spraying operations in South America and the Caribbean and which had permission to over fly Cuba, deliberately sprayed Thrips palmi, an insect pest that originated from Asia, over Cuban territory. The formal consultative meeting was unable to show that a Thrips palmi outbreak in Cuba was caused by the aircraft.15 There is widespread concern that such allegations are frivolous and that, partly for this reason, they have the potential to cause serious harm to the treaty by undermining its credibility.16

Under Article VI of the BTWC, parties may lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council if they feel that another BTWC party has violated the treaty.17 This mechanism has never been formally invoked. However, since the 1960s, Cuba has, for example, periodically issued statements at the UN and elsewhere to the effect that the USA has engaged in various forms of biological warfare against it. The USA never invoked the Article VI provisions with regard to its suspicion that the Soviet Union was pursuing an offensive biological weapon programme, in spite of the fact that it was fairly certain that a 1979 anthrax outbreak in the Ural mountain city of Sverdlovsk (Ekaterinburg) was evidence of a violation. A credible international investigation, including the carrying out of onsite inspections, was not possible at the time given the cold war political climate. In addition, the procedures and technologies necessary to implement "managed access" during onsite inspections were underdeveloped and largely untested.18 The outbreak was subsequently shown to have resulted from a Soviet offensive biological weapon programme in violation of the country’s BTWC commitments.19

Finally, both the BTWC and the CWC cover toxins. Investigations of the alleged use of toxins or of their manufacture may be pursued through a challenge inspection under the CWC. As of September 2004, no challenge inspections or allegations of alleged use have been requested under the CWC. The British Government has included toxins as part of its preparations to receive possible challenge inspections under the CWC on its territory.

III.
Political and technical developments related to compliance

A number of efforts have been undertaken by BTWC parties to develop and implement measures to enhance compliance. Unlike the CWC, the BTWC has no secretariat to oversee treaty implementation.20 BTWC parties do not submit annual, legally binding declarations on activities relevant to parties demonstrating treaty compliance to each other, and no "visits" are conducted on either a routine or random basis to confirm the veracity of such declarations.21 There is also no BTWC inspectorate to investigate compliance concerns, such as allegations of use.

The Second Review Conference, held on 8-26 September 1986, agreed a series measures (CBMs).22 Although the exercise has proved useful in a number of respects, data submissions have often been incomplete. Most parties have not made submissions and parties that have done so have often done so intermittently. Partly for these reasons, the Third Review Conference, held on 9-22 September 1991, established an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint (VEREX). This group identified 21 potential measures, both on- and off-site, which could be used, in various combinations, to promote assurance of treaty compliance.23 These measures formed the basis of work for an ad hoc group (AHG) of BTWC parties that met between January 1995 and August 2001 to negotiate a legally binding protocol to strengthen BTWC compliance. However, the Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC parties, which met on 19 November-7 December 2001, was suspended following the tabling of a motion by the USA to end the AHGs mandate. The USA cited concerns that the draft protocol would inter alia risk divulging sensitive biodefence-related activities, and confidential business information. It rejected the draft protocol, a compromise clean text (i.e., containing no bracketed language) prepared by the AHG chairman, and the appropriateness of the entire exercise. The rejection of the principle of having a protocol at all was largely unexpected, shocking and upsetting many in delegations and elsewhere.24 Although the AHG mandate has not been formally revoked, negotiations on a legally binding protocol are suspended indefinitely.25 The review conference was then adjourned at least partly in order to keep open the possibility of continuing protocol negotiations. After reconvening in plenary session on 7 December 2002, the parties agreed to hold annual meetings of national experts followed by annual meetings of BTWC parties (the "New Process") until the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC parties meets in 2006. The mandate for the annual meetings is "to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on:

i. the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation [2003];
ii. national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins [2003];
iii. enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease[2004];
iv. strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants[2004];
v. the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists[2005].26

IV.
The "New Process"

The New Process is an inter-sessional mechanism that allows the parties to discuss technical and political matters connected with the effective implementation of the BTWC.27 This is necessary partly because most of the parties have either no comprehensive implementing legislation or legislation that has not been fully implemented. The New Process has, arguably, resulted in more concrete measures being taken to address biosecurity and biosafety issues than during the AHGs protocol deliberations. Part of the discussion has also focused on the role of the UN Secretary-General in carrying out investigations of alleged use or possibly sending investigation teams to states where compliance concerns exist. Nevertheless, the work carried out under the New Process is essentially of an ad hoc nature partly because there is no standing Technical Secretariat, and there are no legally binding requirements for the regular provision of information or the acceptance of international inspectors onto the territories of member states. Finally, there is no guarantee that an inter-sessional process will continue between review conferences when the Sixth Review Conference concludes its meeting in 2006.

The "New Process" is probably the most useful type of mechanism within the BTWC framework that could bridge the gap between the two opposing views over whether any new international, multilateral mechanism or regimes should be established in order to strengthen the international prohibition against biological weapons. Due to the fact that the New Process is concerned with fewer issues, the work carried out by the parties can be viewed as being more focused and, perhaps, more effective. However, other issues that were considered by some to be of great importance during the AHG negotiations are not included in the New Process mandate. Perhaps the most politically sensitive such issue is the effective implementation of article X of the BTWC that states inter alia "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes...This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of States Parties to the Convention...".28 Some parties-including China, India and Iran-have argued that the coordination of national export controls on dual-use technology, equipment and materials is not compatible with the implementation of article X.

In considering this issue, it should be noted that (a) no state has ever formally questioned the right of another state to implement national export controls, (b) no state has ever formally questioned the right of another state to communicate with another state (As the AG is not a formal organization, it may, in practice, be unclear at what point communication between states would be considered objectionable to AG opponents.), and (c) the quality and consistency of information provided to the OPCW Technical Secretariat on declarable chemical transfers has, in practice, varied widely. Any such institutional structure created within the framework of the BTWC would experience similar difficulties unless there were a sufficiently high political commitment by the parties to address this issue. In addition, decisions are generally taken by consensus and the parties cannot easily be compelled to take actions they do not wish to take. Multilateral organizations open to universal membership operate on the principle that all the parties have equal rights and responsibilities and that the parties should view the regime as an opportunity to demonstrate their treaty compliance. The value of such regimes is partly based on the long term results of the interaction among those involved in treaty implementation.

Those who are skeptical of multilateral regimes often argue that a single violation (or suspected violation) is sufficient to fundamentally undermine the value of the regime as a whole, at least where CBRN weapons are concerned. 29 Such a view cannot always be easily applied when considering specific compliance concerns where, for example, there can be disagreement over what constitutes a fundamental as opposed to a "technical" violation.

In addition, the derivation and use of information to support an investigation within a multilateral framework can be problematic in cases where there is trade-off between revealing intelligence sources and methods versus providing sufficient and credible evidence of a violation to assist international inspectors.The information provided by states that believe a convention violation has occurred must also be politically convincing to other states. Otherwise states may express skepticism about the reliability and interpretation of such information .A further complication is the fact that In addition most technologies, equipment and materials that may be used in an offensive biological weapon programmer dual use. Also, many of the activities conducted in an offensive may also be legitimately carried out as part of a defensive. (No state is expected to provide unlimited access to sensitive biodefence and industrial facilities, as well as related information.) Finally,intelligence information is usually of a type that would not be sufficient to allow for a conviction in a court of law. It is generally not possible for outside observers to determine the extent to which political considerations may affect the interpretation of ambiguous intelligence information as they do not have the necessary security clearances or access to the relevant information

US administration policy

Broadly speaking the two approaches to strengthen the BTWC are: (a) an arrangement in which there are no new legally binding commitments or international frameworks, and (b) the establishment of additional, legally binding commitments or the further development of institutions within the BTWC regime (e.g., through the adoption of a BTWC protocol). There is a general view that the current US administration would not participate in the meetings if the other parties were to attempt to pursue the latter approach. In such a case, the principle of decision-making by consensus would be broken and the utility of the regime would, without US participation, be undermined.

A September 2004 policy statement by US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton summarized the rationale for US nonproliferation policies:

‘Some supporters of “multi-lateralism” prefer to talk about its glories in the abstract rather than take action in the here and now. The Bush administration’s nonproliferation policies fall into the latter category. Rather than rely on cumbersome treaty-based bureaucracies, this administration has launched initiatives that involve cooperative action with other sovereign states to deny rogue nations and terrorists access to the materials and know-how needed to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD).Our policies show that [through the] robust use of the sovereign authorities we and our allies possess can produce real results.

The Bush administration is reinventing the nonproliferation regime it inherited,crafting policies to fill gaping holes, reinforcing earlier patchwork fixes, assembling allies, creating precedents and changing perceived realities and stilted legal thinking.The front lines in our nonproliferation strategy must extend beyond the well-known rogue states to the trade routes and entities engaged in supplying proliferant countries.This can properly not be described as “non-proliferation,” but as “counter-proliferation.”To accomplish this, we are making more robust use of existing authorities,including sanctions, interdiction and credible export controls. Most importantly, we have taken significant steps to improve coordination between sovereign states to act against proliferators...

......this administration is working to make up for decades of stillborn plans, wishful thinking and irresponsible passivity. We’re already late, but we are no longerbystanders wringing our hands and hoping that somehow we will find shelter from gathering threats. We are no longer lost in endless international negotiations whose point seems to be negotiation rather than decision, and no longer waiting beneath the empty protection of a reluctant international body while seeking grudging permission to take measures to protect ourselves.

Mr Bush has begun laying the foundation for a comprehensive root-and-branchapproach to the mortal danger of the proliferation of instruments intended for our destruction. We are determined to use every resource at our disposal -- using diplomacy regularly, economic pressure when it makes a difference, active law enforcement when appropriate and military force when we must.

We are just at the beginning, but it is an extraordinary beginning. Not only are we meeting this ultimate of threats on the field, we are advancing on it, battling not only aggressively, but successfully. And so we must for the outcome of this battle may hold nothing less than the chance to survive’.30

In contrast to the Reagan administration policies of 1980–88, the current US policy is opposed to any new multilateral arms control and disarmament treaty that includes legally-binding reporting and verification requirements. For example, in 2004 the US delegation to the Conference on Disarmament (CD)in Geneva indicated to the other delegations that it is prepared begin negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile nuclear materials (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, FMCT) provided the treaty does not include verificationprovisions.31

The US administration has instead elected to inter alia seek to harmonize and improve national implementing legislation against biological weapons, to improve international disease surveillance and response, and to address specific compliance concerns without reference to a BTWC protocol. It seeks to achieve this partly through bilateral contacts and various activities conducted in other flor a such as the World Organisation for Animal Health (Official International des Epizooties, OIE), the Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO)..

V. Sixth Review Conference

Possible outcomes for the Sixth Review Conference and strategies to strengthen the international prohibition against biological warfare include:(a) ensuring that all BTWC parties are also members of other organizations that deal with biological weapon-related issues, (b) the suggestion that a series of additional, more narrowly focused protocols or agreements be agreed (e.g.,to make legally binding the current annual, politically binding data exchanges), (c) for the EU or other like-minded groups of states to carry out initiatives either within the BTWC framework or in parallel to the BTWC framework, (d) to revisit and somehow operationalize the 1925 Geneva Protocol,32 (e) to maintain the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission’s (UNMOVIC) organizational expertise and capabilities and use them to support the UN Secretary-General’s authority to investigate alleged use of biological weapons, and (f) ways of integrating the work carried out under UN Security Council resolution 1540 with the work carried out within the BTWC framework. A further point is whether or how the New Process can or should be continued after the 2006 Review Conference. Most, if not all,such points have been considered in some form by outside observers or by the participants themselves.33

The timeframe for taking measures to strengthen the BTWC can be divided into two parts. One is the period from the present until the Sixth Review Conference meets in 2006. The second consists of long term, essentially openended efforts. It is also useful to consider how BTWC issues are structured and analysed and to get a sense of what the political views are among the parties,and their levels of interest and their capabilities. To do so, the work of the Sixth Review Conference may be evaluated according to: (a) general political considerations, climate and outlook, (b) technical and scientific questions,(c) procedural or functional matters, and (d) elements of a follow-on (or‘final’) result to efforts to strengthen the BTWC.

There are at least two key actions that the Review Conference should undertake. One is to agree a well-drafted, clear political statement. Such statements are valuable in that they help to strengthen the international ‘norm’against biological warfare and can be used to support later, more technical deliberations. In a similar manner, the 1993 Paris Resolution helped to inform negotiations of the OPCW’s Preparatory Commission (PrepCom). The Sixth Review Conference should also ensure that a mechanism is put in place that allows the BTWC parties to meet annually until, at a minimum, the Seventh Review Conference meets.

Outcome

The outcome of the Sixth Review Conference depends on a number of interrelated considerations. Assuming that the parties do not elect to break with the past practice of taking decisions by consensus, a key question will be whether the Democratic party wins the US presidential election in November 2004 and,if so, what, if any, effect, this will have on current US policy. Assuming that US policy remains essentially unchanged, the contours of what is acceptable and not acceptable to the USA have been indicated to the BTWC parties prior to New Process meetings.

For example, prior to the 2004 meeting of experts, the US indicated the type of outcomes that it would not accept and the type of outcomes that it wished to avoid. It indicated that it was opposed to: (a) the establishment of any new mechanism, inside or outside the BTWC framework, to carry out work related to the investigation of outbreaks of disease or investigations of alleged biological weapon use; (b) reorganizing UNMOVIC into a UN body to bemused to investigate outbreaks of disease or alleged biological weapon use; and(c) revising clarification procedures either within the BTWC framework or that connected with the UN Secretary-General’s authority to send investigative teams. The only exception to (c) would be to update lists of national expert sand national laboratories that UN member states may provide to assist the UN Secretary-General in the exercise of his authority to investigate alleged use of biological and, perhaps, chemical weapons. The USA also indicated that it would like to avoid the establishment of any new multilateral mechanism or regime to monitor or respond to diseases or any attempt to agree language to13the effect that the implementation of export controls is incompatible with BTWC parties’ obligations under article X.

VI. Conclusions

There are no simple or straightforward solutions to the various biological weapon-related concerns. Discussions regarding the BTWC regime may also appear obscure or somewhat removed from actual world events. However, the implementation of any agreement, including bilateral, involves some uncertainty and disagreement among the parties. It is also important for those involved in biological weapon-related issues to periodically familiarize themselves with the relevant background issues and developments.

The BTWC parties cannot predetermine all possible theoretical outcomes. In addition, every issue is informed by political concerns and interests, including those that are seemingly purely technical or purely scientific in nature. If there is a high level of political interest and involvement, the more general or technical disagreements regarding implementation issues can, in principle, be handled satisfactorily.

Although the BTWC was meant to be used to address specific compliance concerns, the formal work carried out within the regime has usually focused on general procedures and the need to meet longer term, more general threats.Some of the uncertainty regarding whether or how the regime might become better focused and more credible will continue until (or unless) specific compliance concerns are taken up within the BTWC framework more frequently.

1 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction is reproduced on the SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Project Internet site at URL <http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/ docs/bw-btwc-text.html>. Complete lists of parties, signatory and non-signatory states are available at the SIPRI CBW Project Internet site at URL <http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc -mainpage.html>.
2 BTWC Meeting of Experts document BWC/MSP.2004/MX/INF.4, 15 July 2004.
3 See Annexes 1 and 2. Taiwan ratified the BTWC in 1973 but is no longer a member state of the United Nations and is officially considered to be a part of mainland China.
4 See Australia Group Internet site, URL <http://www.australiagroup.net>.
5 UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 28 Apr. 2004, p. 1.
6 UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 28 Apr. 2004, paras. 1-5
7 UN, Charter of the UN, "Chapter VII, Action with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression", URL <http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapter7.html>
8 For a review of compliance and verification mechanisms available to the BTWC parties in cases of alleged use of biological weapons, see "Mechanisms available to states parties to investigate the alleged use of biological and toxin weapons and to provide assistance in such cases", BTWC meeting of experts document BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.3, 1 July 2004.
9 The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol, 1925); and UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/42/37, 30 Nov. 1987, URL <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/a42r037.htm>. The Geneva Protocol was the principal international agreement restricting the use of chemical and biological weapons before the entry into force of the 1972 BTWC and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. Both the BTWC and CWC reaffirm the principles and objectives of, and obligations assumed under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
10 The ownership of the territory where chemical weapons were alleged used by Armenia against Azerbaijan is disputed by the countries.
11 E.g., see "Report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate reports of the use of chemical weapons in Azerbaijan", UN document S/24344, 24 July 1992; Annex: report of the group of experts to investigate reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons", UN document A/37/259, 1 Dec. 1982; "and "Perry Robinson, J. and Goldblat, J., "Chemical warfare in the Iran-Iraq War", SIPRI fact sheet, May 1984, URL <http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/factsheet-1984.html>.
12 "Agreement concerning the relationship between the United Nations and the Organisation for the P r o h i b i t i o n o f C h e m i c a l W e a p o n s " , e f f e c t i v e 2 0 0 1 , URL < http://www.opcw.org/html/db/legal/rel_agree.html>.
13 "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with this Charter". BTWC, Article V.
14 Final Document of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Part II, Final Declaration, BTWC Third Review Conference document BWC/CONF.III/23, 27 Sept. 1991, p. 15.
15Zanders, J. P. and Hart, J., "Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control",SIPRI Yearbook 1998: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press:Oxford, 1998), pp. 479-480.
16 Zilinskas, R., "Cuban Allegations of Biological Warfare By the United States: Assessing the Evidence", Critical Reviews in Microbiology, vol. 25, no. 3, (1999), pp. 173-228.
17 "1. Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council...". BTWC, Article VI.
18 Managed access is a term referring to procedures and techniques that allow inspected states to demonstrate compliance with treaty provisions without revealing sensitive military or civilian business information. Regular onsite inspections of military facilities in the US and Soviet Union were first implemented under the terms of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF treaty), which entered into force on 1 June 1988. In Jan. 1988, the US established an onsite inspection agency, since folded into the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), to host and conduct onsite inspections. The principle of managed access is now well established and is implemented under most arms control and disarmament agreements, including the 1970 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the CWC.
19 Guilleman, J., Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak (University of California Press: 1999), 339 pp; and Hart, J., "The Soviet biological weapons program", in Dando, M., Rozsa, L. and Wheelis, M. (eds), Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons since 1945 (Harvard University Press: Harvard) (in press).
20 The OPCW"s Technical Secretariat is based in The Hague, Netherlands. See URL <http://www.opcw.org>.
21 The word "visit" is generally used by national delegations when discussing onsite inspections. The term reflects the limited intrusiveness of such inspections, as well as the difficulties associated with uncovering information that would point to a violation.
22 The CBMs consisted of providing information on, inter alia, exchange of data on research centres and laboratories; exchange of information on national biological research and development programmes; exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurences caused by toxins; encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge, declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures; declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes; and declaration of vaccine production facilities.
23 Onsite measures included various types of onsite inspections and monitoring, while off-site measures included data exchanges, remote sensing and offsite testing of samples.
24 Significant differences existed among other BTWC parties over the protocol text. There was no guarantee that these differences would have been overcome had the United States elected not to oppose the protocol. The United States action has closed the possibility for negotiating a protocol for the foreseeable future.
25 Apparently some US Government officials have argued that the AHG mandate is no longer in effect as it has been superceded by the adoption of the current inter-sessional process (the "New Process").
26 Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF.V/17, Final Document (Geneva, 2002), pp. 3-4.
27 For a review of the July 2004 meeting see Pearson, G., "BTWC Meeting of Experts, Geneva 19 to 30 July 2004", ASA Newsletter, no. 103 (27 Aug. 2004), pp. 1, 9-11.
28 BTWC, Article X.
29 The question then arises whether chemical, biological and nuclear weapons should be termed‘weapons of mass destruction’. Some chemical and biological warfare agents were designed toincapacitate, not kill. Chemical and biological weapons are, as a rule, less dangerous than nuclearweapons. A possible exception would be low-yield, deep penetrating nuclear weapons (e.g., ‘bunkerbusters).
30 Bolton, J., ‘An all-out war on proliferation’, Financial Times, 7 Sep. 2004, p. 15.
31 US Department of State, ‘Transcript: Bolton: U. S. favors negotiated treaty banning fissilematerials (but says verification provisions should not be included)’, 10 Sep. 2004, Geneva. Distributedvia Arms-Control list server, 13 Sep. 2004.
32 It has been observed that the 80th anniversary of the Protocol next year should be marked by ameeting or process designed to strengthen the BTWC. See, for e.g., Sims, N., ’A proposal for putting the26 March 2005 anniversary to best use for the BWC’.
33 See, for e.g., Jasper, U., ‘The Challenge of biological weapons: proposals for greater EUeffectiveness’, Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 78 (July/Aug. 2004); Pearson, G. S. and Dando, M. R.(eds), The Second Meeting of Experts in July 2004: Common Understandings and Effective Actions,Briefing Paper no. 12 (second series) (Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford: Bradford,UK, July 2004); Sims, N., ’A proposal for putting the 26 March 2005 anniversary to best use for theBWC’, CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 62 (Dec. 2003), pp. 1–6; Tucker, J., ‘Strengthening the BWC: away forward’, Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 78, (July/Aug. 2004); and Tucker, J., ‘The BWC newprocess: a preliminary assessment’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 11, no. 1 (spring 2004), pp. 26–39. Seealso Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford (UK), ‘Preventing biological warfare:strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention’, URL<http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/>; and BioWeapons Prevention Project Internet site URL<http://www.bwpp.org>.
34 Private communication with EU government official, Sep. 2004.

Annex 1

Non-signatories to the BTWC
1. Andorra
2. Angola
3. Azerbaijan
4. Cameroon
5. Chad
6. Comoros
7. Cook Islands
8. Djibouti
9. Eritrea
10. Guinea
11. Israel
12. Kazakhstan
13. Kiribati
14. Kyrgystan
15. Marshall Islands
16. Mauritania
17. Micronesia
18. Moldova
19. Mozambique

20. Namibia
21. Nauru
22. Niue
23. Tajikistan
24. Trinidad & Tobago
25. Tuvalu
26. Western Samoa
27. Zambia
_____________________________________________________________________________
Source: Author compilation.

Annex 2

Signatories that have signed, but not ratified, the BTWC
1. Burundi
2. Central African Republic
3. Côte d-Ivoire
4. Egypt
5. Gabon
6. Guyana
7. Haiti
8. Liberia
9. Madagascar
10. Malawi
11. Myanmar
12. Nepal
13. Somalia
14. Syrian Arab Republic
15. Tanzania
16. United Arab Emirates
_______________________________________________________

Source: Author compilation.